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WEEKLY REPORT**THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

23 March 1966

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

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DIA review(s) completed.

USAID review completed

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(17 March - 23 March 1966)

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(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)

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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

Political unrest continues in I Corps, with a new note of militancy evidently sparked by Buddhist leaders who claim that the Ky regime is backing away from promised concessions for a more rapid transition to representative government. Behind-the-scenes contacts between Saigon officials and the Buddhists are reportedly continuing, with no apparent give on either side to date. Ousted I Corps commander General Thi, meanwhile, remains in the northern area in apparent defiance of government orders to return to Saigon, and may be awaiting an opportunity for a comeback should Ky's position appear in jeopardy.

The tempo of military activity picked up over the weekend, largely as a result of Viet Cong actions, following several days of comparatively light contact from continuing allied operations. Most of the Viet Cong actions were successfully countered by friendly troops and resulted in heavy Communist losses.

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I.. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Political agitation against the Ky government took on new militancy this week. The intensified campaign is primarily Buddhist inspired, and is in reaction to a decision taken by the ruling generals at a meeting on 18 March to hold firm against Buddhist demands for an early return to civilian rule.

2. For the present, protest activity remains centered in I Corps, where students and other groups supporting the Buddhist stand can draw on the sympathy of local military and civilians identifying themselves with the cause of ousted corps commander General Thi. In recent days, however, Thi's removal has been largely ignored, and agitation is increasingly taking the form of direct attacks on government leaders in Saigon.

3. Prior to the Directorate meeting on 18 March, Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu held several talks with Buddhist leaders to explore possible areas of agreement with the four points raised by the Buddhists. Ranking Buddhist leaders claimed after talks on 17 March that the government had promised to substitute some form of elected body to draft a constitution, rather than the appointive council now envisaged. However, government leaders maintain that--whether through misunderstanding or deliberate distortion--Buddhist leaders took mere discussion of such proposals to mean agreement.

4. Whatever the facts, the generals at their 18 March meeting decided to proceed with their original plans and timetable for "democracy building." They nevertheless issued a broadly worded communiqué that left the door open to possible modifications should Buddhist pressure subside. There were indications of some differences among the generals over how to handle the Buddhists, with at least some of them, including Premier Ky, inclined toward a "tough line." Immediately after the meeting, Ky departed for the resort town of Da Lat, where he issued a sharp statement over the weekend declaring that pressure tactics would not cause the government to yield to the "unjustified" demands of those who would "betray and sell out the nation."

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5. The Buddhist reaction to both the Directorate's stand and to Ky's intemperate remarks was prompt, although possibly indicative of differences of approach among rival Buddhist leaders Tam Chau and Tri Quang. Buddhist Institute chairman Chau addressed a mass meeting of the Buddhist faithful in Saigon on 19 March, setting forth publicly the Buddhist claim that the government had made promises, but cautioning patience in the hope that these promises would be fulfilled if present tensions were eased. Subsequently, the Institute issued a communiqué in the name of the Unified Buddhist Association, expressing in injured tones "extreme surprise" at Ky's aspersions on Buddhist patriotism in view of the Buddhists' moderation and the fact that they were merely setting forth the "aspirations of the people."

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7. Although there has been no firm information on Tri Quang's activities in I Corps, the agitation there this week--including the seizure of the Hué municipal radio station by Hué University students and a general strike in Da Nang--has been almost entirely in support of the Buddhist demands and along lines privately predicted by Quang. Manifestations of anti-Americanism, which appeared in demonstrations on 23 March, appear to fulfill Quang's earlier warning that the US would not be spared political attacks if it backed the Ky government too strongly.

8. Premier Ky, meanwhile, took the occasion of a public ceremony in Saigon on 22 March to try to retract his harsh attack on the Buddhists. He explained that his references to "unjustified" demands and betrayal referred to the schemes of "colonialists, feudalists, and Communists," and not to the Buddhist leadership. There is evidence that government leaders are currently engaged in intensive behind-the-scenes

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conversations with prominent Buddhists and other groups in a continuing attempt to find some formula for quieting the present campaign, or for dividing the Buddhists among themselves.

9. If these efforts fail, the government may continue to follow a policy of restraint in the hope that the Buddhist agitation will fail to gather momentum and gradually fade out. In recent days, many Vietnamese have expressed the belief that neither the Buddhists nor General Thi can muster any support against the Ky government. Although there are numerous reports that demonstrations are being prepared in Saigon, agitation in the capital has so far been limited, and the bulk of university students show a desire to remain uninvolved. Efforts by the Buddhists to enlist the Catholics and other religious groups in their campaign have been quietly rebuffed, although there is some danger that these groups may eventually react by openly opposing the Buddhists.

10. Should Ky, however, decide to crack down on the present agitation, he risks provoking some incident that might be exploited by the Buddhists--or the Communists--to inflame public emotions. Moreover, the lack of any interference in protest activity to date by officials in I Corps reflects not only caution but some sympathy for the antigovernment forces. There is a danger that orders for repressive action might be defied by authorities in I Corps, with a further weakening of government unity.

11. The continued presence in I Corps of General Thi, originally slated for a visit of only two or three days, is also a potential threat. There is still little evidence of open collusion between Thi and Tri Quang, but Thi has obviously enjoyed the manifestations of opposition to Saigon and the enthusiasm for his own presence. He has so far resisted attempts to order his return to Saigon, and he may yet hope to capitalize on the situation if the protest movement gains momentum.

Economic Situation

12. The execution of the Chinese businessman and increased police pressure to enforce official prices have caused resentment and uncertainty in

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the Chinese business community, resulting in a marked slowdown in business activity, especially in the import sector. Import license applications, which normally run 300-400 per day, were down to 192 on 14 March and 76 on 15 March. Many Chinese businessmen claim the antispeculation drive is directed specifically against them. Vietnamese businessmen who are not dependent on Chinese trade have tended to support the actions taken against speculators, although they are also nervous about the police drive to enforce official prices. Other Vietnamese stress that the Chinese businessmen cannot be replaced and that the GVN must move with caution. A leading Chinese businessman told the US Embassy in Saigon that he had emphasized the seriousness of the situation in a meeting with Economy Minister Thanh, who in turn urged Premier Ky to suspend the police drive temporarily and review the procedures.

13. [REDACTED] there is as yet no evidence of increased capital flight and that the present Chinese attitude is one of wait and see. Most stores and shops are selling at close to official prices although some have closed and others plan to close when present inventories are liquidated. Black market activity is at its lowest point since the adoption of Military Payment Certificates (MPCs) in late August 1965.

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14. During the first half of March, rice deliveries from the Mekong delta to Saigon totaled 22,165 metric tons (mt), slightly higher than in January and February. At the same time, wholesale prices per 100 kilograms (kg) of No. 1 rice fell from 810/820 piasters on 1 March to 730/750 piasters on 10 March. On 12 March, Minister of Economy Thanh summoned rice merchants to discuss the amount and the price they would be willing to sell to the government. The merchants met on 18 March and offered to supply 50,000 mt at about 800 piasters per 100 kg. In the meantime, the Embassy recommends that in addition to scheduled PL 480 rice, the US should send 125,000 mt of rice under the Commercial Import Program between late July and the end of October in order to avoid the possibility of dangerously low stocks. Without these shipments, it is estimated that rice stocks in Saigon and deficit areas could drop to 1,500 mt by the end of October and remain at very low levels in November and December.

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15. Port congestion in Saigon, a long-standing problem, has grown noticeably worse during the first two weeks of March. While importers and customs officials point accusing fingers at each other, only about 1,100 tons per day are being cleared from the clogged transit sheds, compared to a normal flow of 5,000 to 6,000 tons. The US Mission is conducting a thorough investigation.

16. In the week ending 14 March, the over-all level of retail prices in Saigon remained virtually unchanged as declines in certain vegetable prices offset a rise in the price of fish. The USAID index did not change, remaining at three percent below the previous month. Prices of most imported commodities remained the same or fell still further as traders sought to clear stocks in the wake of the execution of the Chinese businessman and the increase in government efforts to enforce official prices. Because of the port congestion and the sharp drop in import license applications, stocks may not be quickly replenished and the resulting shortages may drive prices higher again.

17. In the Saigon free market, the price of \$10 bills was down 6 piasters to 167 and that of \$10 MPC (scrip) dropped 3 piasters to 116. Gold rose by 2 piasters to 237 per dollar, equaling a previous all-time high. In Hong Kong, the piaster-dollar cross rate was unchanged at 159. Dollars reportedly fell because dealers are reluctant to hold them until the government's economic policy is clarified.

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B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The over-all level of Communist-initiated activity increased for the week ending 19 March.

2. During the period there were 750 Communist-initiated incidents compared with the preceding week's 686--higher than the weekly average for the last half of 1965 but below that for 1966. There were 11 attacks, of which one was large scale, and 412 incidents of terrorism compared to 10 and 466, respectively, for the previous week. The one large-scale attack occurred in Quang Ngai Province. The kill ratio favored Free World forces 2.1 to 1, down from 7.3 to 1. Viet Cong casualties include 627 killed and 59 captured. South Vietnamese casualties for the reporting period were 232 killed, 373 wounded, and 73 missing or captured--a total of 678 compared to the preceding week's 535. US casualty figures for the week were 80 killed, 816 wounded, and 16 missing or captured, compared to the previous week's total of 100 killed, 385 wounded, and 14 missing or captured. Other Free World casualties increased from 22 to 29. The South Vietnamese lost 265 weapons and captured 456 from the Communists; enemy losses included 30 crew-served weapons, while friendly forces lost ten.

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA/ CAPTURED</u>	<u>TOTAL CASUALTIES</u>
US	80	816	16	912
ARVN	232	373	73	678
THIRD COUNTRY	8	21	0	29
VIET CONG	627	---	59	686

GVN/Allied Activities

3. Friendly activity dropped slightly during the week with a decrease in both small- and large-unit operations, but enemy contacts increased. Most of the losses suffered by the Viet Cong were from friendly reaction to Viet Cong - initiated incidents.

4. There was no major allied-initiated activity in I Corps during the week and action was limited to minor contacts.

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5. In II Corps, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, continued Operation HARRISON in Phu Yen Province with no significant enemy contact. The unit seized a cache of 92 assorted Viet Cong weapons and uncovered a battalion-size training camp. Cumulative results from this operation so far indicate that the Viet Cong have lost 234 killed, 13 captured, and 157 individual and 16 crew-served weapons seized. US losses are 35 killed, 216 wounded, and two missing. In Operation GARFIELD, the 3d Brigade, 25th Division, contacted an estimated Viet Cong company in Darlac Province. During the engagement, friendly forces suffered 11 killed and 27 wounded while the Viet Cong sustained 33 killed. The cumulative results of Operation GARFIELD thus far show that Viet Cong losses have included 79 killed, 14 captured, and 42 individual weapons. US losses have been 16 killed and 61 wounded. There were no ARVN operations of consequence during the week.

6. US/Free World forces continued Operation SILVER CITY in the area of War Zone D in III Corps. A cache of 47 individual and 20 crew-served weapons was located. On 16 March, a large Viet Cong force attacked the 2d Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry. In the ensuing action, the airborne battalion was supported by over 50 close air sorties and heavy artillery fire. Friendly forces suffered eight killed and 119 wounded while the Viet Cong lost 285 killed and one captured. Cumulative losses to date in the operation have been 25 killed (23 US, 2 AUS), 248 wounded (240 US, 8 AUS), one UH-1 helicopter destroyed, and seven UH-1 helicopters, one armored personnel carrier, and one 25-ton truck damaged. The Viet Cong have lost 337 killed, one captured, 79 individual and 59 crew-served weapons, five 25-ton trucks, two 5-ton trucks, two Landrovers, 331 tons of rice, 7.6 tons of salt, and 800 gallons of fuel. US/ARVN Operation HONOLULU/AN DAN 42/66 was conducted between 14 and 19 March. Friendly forces suffered 15 killed (3 US) and 76 wounded (52 US). Viet Cong losses were 18 killed, 19 captured, and ten individual and three crew-served weapons.

7. In IV Corps on 15 March, the 7th ARVN Division reacted within four hours to a Viet Cong attack on one of its battalions. The two-day operation resulted in 11 friendly killed and 45 wounded. Viet

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Cong losses were 58 killed and six captured, with one antiaircraft machine gun, 13 individual weapons, and one AN/PRC-10 radio captured or destroyed.

8. Free World forces conducted 90 battalion-size or larger operations during the week, 40 of them achieving contact: 27 ARVN, two ROK, and 11 US. There were 22,670 small-unit operations, including 2,989 conducted by US forces. Of the 162 that achieved contact with the enemy, 112 were conducted by US units.

9. There were ten B-52 Stratofortress missions over South Vietnam during the week ending 20 March 1966, with ground follow-up exploitation scheduled for two of these missions. No bomb damage assessments have been received. During the period 4-10 March 1966 a total of 3,240 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown by the combined efforts of US Navy, Air Force, Marine, and VNAF aircraft. In addition to close air support, direct air support, and interdiction missions in support of ground operations, the following damage was inflicted: 2,578 structures, 64 sampans, 15 bunkers, 4 bridges, 7 AW sites, 20 gun positions, 18 boats, 2 trucks, and 1 radio tower destroyed; 1,790 structures, 60 sampans, 7 bunkers, 3 boats, and 1 truck park damaged. In addition, two roads were cratered, 4 tunnels were collapsed, and 52 secondary explosions were observed. Two USAF and two VNAF aircraft were lost. The pilot of an air force A1 Skyraider lost to ground fire was rescued, but the pilot of an air force F-100 Supersabre lost to unknown causes was killed. The pilot of a VNAF A1 downed by ground fire was killed, and the VNAF forward air controller in an O1F Birdog associated with this mission failed to return and is listed as missing.

Communist Activity

10. Communist activity increased in I Corps. An estimated Viet Cong battalion ambushed a convoy of the 2d Battalion, 4th ARVN Regiment, in Quang Ngai Province on 14 March. Friendly losses included 31 killed, six wounded, five missing, and 40 weapons. The Viet Cong lost 75 killed and 15 weapons.

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11. The incident rate in II Corps decreased for the third week and no attacks were recorded. [REDACTED] North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) units in South Vietnam are undergoing sand-table exercises in preparation for simultaneous attacks on the special forces camps at Plei Me and Duc Co, and on the Le Thanh District town. The units involved are the 32d, 33d, and 66th regiments and a recently infiltrated antiaircraft unit. While the attacks are taking place, local forces and some PAVN units will harass friendly installations and units in Pleiku. The attack is planned for the rainy season. COMUSMACV states that credence is lent to the report by the indication of movement by the 32d and 33d PAVN regiments back to Pleiku.

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12. Enemy activity decreased in III Corps during the week. In Binh Duong Province an unidentified Viet Cong force attacked the 2d Battalion, 8th ARVN Regiment, on 14 March. Friendly losses were 19 killed and four wounded. Viet Cong losses were 31 killed and two captured. The attacking force could have been made up of elements of the Phu Lai Local Force Battalion which operates in the area. [REDACTED] the Viet Cong's Saigon - Gia Dinh Region has two regiments, the 165A and 165B. The 165A regiment (also known as the Capital Liberation Regiment) is organized into three battalions (7th, 8th, and 9th). The regiment expects to receive new weapons soon, including 120-mm. mortars. COMUSMACV currently accepts the 165A as confirmed but not 165B. Previous reports of Viet Cong plans to organize two Capital Liberation Regiments tend to support the returnee's statements.

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13. The enemy incident level remained low in IV Corps, although a slight increase was registered. On 15 March in Dinh Tuong Province, the base camp of the 1st Battalion, 10th ARVN Regiment, came under heavy fire from an estimated Viet Cong battalion. Two hours later, the three battalions of the 11th ARVN Regiment received mortar fire. On 12 March, the Viet Cong reportedly used an unknown irritant-gas grenade while harassing a watchtower in Vinh Binh Province.


14. Portions of National Route 1 are closed in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and Long Khanh provinces.

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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



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Route 14 is closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Route 19 is closed west of Duc Co, Pleiku Province. Route 7 is closed in Phu Yen Province. Route 20 is closed in Lam Dong Province. Interprovincial Route 1 is closed in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces. Highway 4 is closed in Dinh Tuong Province.

15. The national railroad is operating between Saigon and Xuan Loc in Long Khanh Province; between Ca Na in Binh Thuan Province and Ninh Hoa in Khanh Hoa Province; between Da Lat and Phan Rang, Ninh Thuan Province; and between Da Nang, Quang Nam Province, and Hue, Thua Thien Province.

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C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

1. Since the February Honolulu conference, GVN and US officials have been actively engaged in putting the numerous theoretical concepts of pacification into action programs. General Thang, minister for Revolutionary Development, has completed his tours of the 43 provinces, spot-checking interim cadre teams, chatting with villagers, and confirming provincial goals for work to be completed by the end of June. Pressures to produce results by midyear seem to be great, in spite of the fact that the first class of 4,700 cadre-group trainees will not be in their provinces until then.

2. The Viet Cong have been quick to react to the threat of GVN programs aimed at the segment of the population on whom the Communists have traditionally depended for support--the apolitical rural villagers. The Viet Cong Liberation Radio has announced a determination "to smash the rural pacification program and deal very strong blows at enemy teams." Nguyen Huu Tho, the Liberation Front chairman, exhorted the populace to "bravely struggle and firmly frustrate the enemy plot of occupation and pacification." In mid-March the Viet Cong threw grenades at an audience watching a JUSPAO (USIA) drama team medical lecture, 15 miles northeast of Saigon, killing two villagers and wounding 17.

3. A primary reason for increased optimism in the Revolutionary Development program is the unique training being given to the cadre groups at Vung Tau. Significant portions of the curriculum are devoted to the effective motivation and indoctrination of the trainee. Subjects studies include the nature of Communist aggression, Vietnamese history and sociology, governmental organization and programs, and psychological warfare. The aim of the program is to enable graduates to refute Communist propaganda not as a mechanical exercise but through pride in their nation and an understanding of the rural population, which, if treated with respect and affection, can be a great source of national strength. Students train together with others from their own province or district, compete with other provincial groups, and, being from the countryside, dress and act like the villagers with whom they will ultimately work.

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4. As previously reported, the 59-man cadre group consists of four major elements and a staff of eight. The 33-man People's Action Team (PAT), whose primary function is to provide security, will seek out and destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure, and train the villagers to defend themselves. The six-man Census-Grievance Team will take a census in the village, interview all the adult inhabitants to determine their aspirations and grievances, identify the Viet Cong infrastructure, and train a member of each hamlet to continue the team's activities after it leaves. The duties of the six-man New Life Development Team are to determine the type and degree of economic assistance needed, initiate self-help projects, distribute government-furnished commodities, and gradually involve the people in the use of materials and techniques to improve sanitation and living conditions. The onus of training village and hamlet officials and making them responsible to the people's needs and aspirations lies with the six-man Civil Affairs Team. The basic consideration involved in this approach is that the villagers will identify with the GVN and the nation in direct proportion to the effectiveness of the officials with whom they must deal. If no government administrative organs exist, the Civil Affairs Team will develop temporary structures until elections can be organized. Key members of the eight-man staff are the assistant for psychological warfare, the assistant for intelligence and liaison, and the three health workers who will provide medical assistance.

5. Returnees (Chieu Hoi). Since the returnee program is being revitalized, the US Mission has decided to discontinue temporarily the daily and weekly tallies. Preliminary reports from JUSPAO are encouraging in regard to the safe-conduct pass leaflet campaign which is being coordinated with intensified B-52 strikes. The major motivating factor of the 245 returnees in Tay Ninh Province who came in during the first two-and-a-half months of 1966 is reportedly the combination of B-52 raids and leaflet drops. It has been reported that since the Viet Cong have imposed the death penalty for possession of the leaflets, returnees read them but are reluctant to carry them around.

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
6. The construction and repair of provincial returnee centers is the subject of increased pressure from the national Chieu Hoi secretariat; and plans are afoot to build Chieu Hoi villages. Moreover, joint psyops planning is being developed to provide themes that will appeal to the 13-to-18 age group in order to deny the Viet Cong this source of manpower. It is felt that this age group probably does not yet identify firmly with either Communism or nationalism.

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NORTH VIETNAM: **Airfield Construction and Improvement Program**



AIRFIELD, RUNWAY LENGTH	RUNWAY, TAXIWAY IMPROVEMENTS	OTHER ACTIVITY
Phu Yen 8720 feet concrete	11,000 feet taxiway to dispersal area completed	Large hangar completed, large POL storage area U/C, 49 revetments completed, 12 under construction
Kep 5975 feet concrete	Runway recently resurfaced Taxiway U/C	Dispersal area U/C with 12 revetments, 15 revetments completed.
Hanoi/Gia Lam 6550 feet concrete	Parking Apron completed Runway recently extended to 6550 feet, still U/C. Includes alert apron.	U/I construction activity underway near taxiway, several revetments U/C
Hanoi/Bach Mai 5200 feet concrete and asphalt	Runway in process of being lengthened to 5200 feet; however, work has been progressing slowly	Hangar being improved
Haiphong/Kien An 5960 feet concrete	Runway in process of being widened, runway and taxiway being resurfaced, new alert apron U/C	Aircraft dispersal area with three revetments in late stages of construction
Haiphong/Cat Bi 7700 feet concrete		A number of new revetments have been constructed.
Phu Tho 4400 feet unknown	Runway is being resurfaced and will be 5400 feet when completed; loop taxiway U/C	Several new revetments U/C, old revetments along runway have been destroyed, four other revetments completed, AW positions completed
Lang Son 3600 foot sod Bai Thuong 6600 feet U/C	Airfield under construction	13 new revetments complete or under construction Four large revetments completed and one U/C
Yen Bai 61826	Status undetermined, but if it proves to be an airfield the runway could be 6100 ft long.	

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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. A recently completed photographic study of North Vietnamese airfields has revealed that the extensive airfield improvement and construction program begun last year is making good progress. Work has been noted on eight airfields. In addition, one and possibly two other major fields are being built. The most significant activity--including major improvements to runway capacities--is being conducted at five airfields within the Hanoi-Haiphong defense ring: Phuc Yen, Kep, Gia Lam, Hanoi/Bac Mai, and Haiphong/Kien An. At airfields outside the defense perimeter, apart from the new fields being built, construction is confined mostly to revetments.

2. Thus far, North Vietnam's fighter aircraft have been staged out of only two bases, Phuc Yen and Kep. However, it is likely that some fighters will be dispersed to other major fields when construction projects there are completed.

3. A recent review of [] drone photography of Phuc Yen airfield has disclosed 53 aircraft crates.

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25X1 [] Prior to the [] photography, it had been thought that aircraft in North Vietnam numbered 63 MIG-15/17s, 15 MIG-21s, and eight IL-28s.

4. During the past week, four US aircraft have been downed over North Vietnam by surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), bringing to 19 the total number of US planes lost to SAMs. Two of these recent losses--both A4C Skyhawks--occurred in the vicinity of Cap Mui Ron, indicating that SAM facilities have been deployed farther south in the DRV than previously noted.

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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

A. CAMBODIA

1. Vu Duc Hai, special assistant for ethnic minorities in Premier Ky's office, told an embassy official that Khmer Serei personnel who had gone from Vietnam to Thailand and thence to Cambodia have now begun to reappear in Vietnam

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B. DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS

Tran Van Tuyen, GVN ambassador-designate to London, has delayed his scheduled departure due to the current political situation.

C. FREE WORLD AID

1. REPUBLIC OF KOREA. On 20 March, the ROK National Assembly passed a consent bill authorizing the dispatch of an additional 20,000 troops to South Vietnam. These will include a division, a regimental

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combat team, and support forces. A government spokesman stated that this action will strengthen Korea's sense of solidarity with free Asian countries faced with the Communist menace. South Korea currently has about 23,000 men in South Vietnam.

2. JAPAN. A medical team from Hokkaido University in Japan left for Vietnam on 17 March. The team of one doctor and two nurses is sponsored by the Asian Good-Nighbor Medical Association with financial help from the Japanese Government's Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency. It expects to remain in Vietnam for about six months and will work at the Central Hospital in Saigon.

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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

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
WEEKLY REPORT

12 MARCH 1966-19 MARCH 1966

Total Personnel Losses


(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)

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US Combat Casualties in Vietnam (including North Vietnam)

	Fatalities	Non-fatal Wounds	Captured	Missing
Cumulative, 1961-1964	255	1524	10	12
Cumulative, 1965	1365	6110	15	136
Cumulative, 1966 to date	1019	5888	7	28
TOTAL	2639	13522	32	176




Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses (US/GVN/Other Free World)


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Killed in action
 Missing or Captured in action
 Wounded in action


Viet Cong Incidents



Viet Cong Attacks



Weapons Losses



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